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A B S T R A C T
Developmental cognitive neuroscience is flourishing but there are new challenges and new questions to be asked.
I argue that we need a bigger picture and an evolutionary framework. This brings some challenges, such as the
need to rewrite the old story of nature and nurture, and the need to systematically investigate innate predis-
positions. While brain imaging has provided some splendid insights and new puzzles to solve, its limitations must
not be ignored. Can they help us to find out more about the extent to which the infant brain already configures
the adult brain? Can we find out why neurodevelopmental disorders often have severe consequences on cog-
nition and behaviour, despite the mitigating force of brain plasticity? I wish to encourage researchers of the
future to take risks by letting their imagination inspire theories to pursue hard questions. I end with a wish list of
topics, from start-up kits to abstract reasoning, that I hope can be tackled afresh. However, collecting physio-
logical and behavioural data is not enough. We need a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of cognitive
development.
1. Introduction
The Flux congress in Berlin in 2018 was a good opportunity to take
stock of where our field is moving. I was delighted to be able to wish
Beatriz Luna, President of the Flux Society, a very happy sixth birthday.
Flux means change, and so it would be wrong to fixate on the current
state. Instead, the congress was an occasion to acknowledge that de-
velopmental science is moving, and like individual development, not
necessarily in a linear fashion. The field of developmental cognitive
neuroscience, as it grows, is like a growing tree and like the growing
mind of a child: it turns, twists and twirls from uncertain beginnings
towards ever more branching paths.
The essential similarities between a growing brain and a growing
plant were revealed with the aid of the electron microscope by Peter R.
Huttenlocher, in whose honour I gave a lecture. He traced the wondrous
changes in the connections of neurons, documented their waxing and
waning, and in particular, the pruning of synapses, and the increases in
axonal growth and myelination (e.g. Huttenlocher and Dabholkar,
1997). In the words of neuroscientist and geneticist Kevin Mitchell
“brains are not built, they’re grown.” Significantly, he adds, “and
growing things is a messy, unpredictable business.”
2. Time to rewrite the old story of nature and nurture
Huttenlocher’s book “Neural plasticity” (Huttenlocher, 2002) had
the subtitle: The effects of environment on the development of the
cerebral cortex. This was very much in line with the spirit of the time.
Today the emphasis has shifted. Mitchell’s book “Innate” (Mitchell,
2018) has the subtitle: How the wiring of our brains shapes who we are.
He argues persuasively that we need to give more prominence to in-
ternal, and importantly, purely random, factors that inexorably and
unpredictably drive the tree-like branching of brain and mind.
Developmental science has lived forever with the tension between
the opposing forces of nature and nurture, and everyone now agrees
that both interact and each is as vital as the other. However, this
somewhat facile agreement remains tied to correlational studies while
weighing up as yet poorly understood ideas from epigenetics. A big
theoretical picture has yet to emerge that takes account of what evo-
lution over millennia has contributed to structure and function of our
brain and mind, and what sheer learning and experience contributes to
every individual’s brain and mind during their lifetime. Somehow, we
have to relate changes in the brain that have happened and are hap-
pening at vastly different scales.
Evolutionary changes need to be studied in complex and pains-
taking experiments in which different species are compared. The
changes that occur over the lifetime of an individual have to be tracked
by longitudinal studies where results will only be known after some
considerable time (Telzer et al., 2018; King et al., 2018). In either case
the results are hard to interpret because of the sheer complexity and
multitude of factors that are involved. Even if we limit ourselves to
studying individual development, we cannot pretend to start with a
tabula rasa, and we need to take account of the fact that individuals are
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deeply embedded in society and culture (e.g. Feldstein Ewing et al.,
2018).
3. The need for theory and the bigger picture
How to sketch out a theory that provides a roadmap through this
jungle of complexity? As Van den Bos and Eppinger (2016) suggest, we
can start with heuristic models for specific domains. But heuristic
models tend to remain piecemeal and are hard to relate to each other,
while theories sketch out the bigger picture, to join up existing ob-
servations, to slot in previously ignored observations, and to predict
entirely new ones. We need to agree on a framework, to create a
common ground, where different theories can be planted. The different
theories can then compete with each other. Some will give better ex-
planations and predictions than others, but all theories carry the risk
that they will be proved wrong. Some researchers shy away from this
risk, but what is the alternative? Collecting masses of data hoping for
results to emerge by themselves? First, this is no less risky than theo-
rising and doing small but well targeted experiments. Second, a dis-
covery only emerges if you have eyes to see it, and you can only see it if
you have some expectation. So, we are back to theory – and back to
getting things wrong. But we need to make mistakes in order to learn.
We should encourage young researchers to take risks and use their
imagination to form abundant theories. There is nothing wrong with
being imaginative and bold, as long as you then test your theory rig-
orously, by setting up detailed hypotheses. Admittedly, there is a knack
to setting up hypotheses so that they lend themselves to decisive ex-
periments. Munafo et al. (2017) give some good advice: Spell out what
you are going test. Be precise about the methods you intend to use for
the experiment. Make sure that you will have adequate statistical
power. If you follow this advice then you can avoid the traps that have
thrown psychology into a replication crisis. Science is a slow business,
and much of the work involved is hidden from view. There are no short
cuts. We should always be suspicious of flashy results. Instead, relia-
bility and replicability are key.
We should encourage young researchers to always try and see the
big picture. Only by keeping in mind the big picture will it be possible
to unite the many different strands of developmental cognitive neu-
roscience (see for example Crone and Ridderinkhof, 2011; Jernigan
et al., 2016). This ambition is likely to lead to new questions about the
relationship between the developing mind and brain and to new an-
swers that will give us important new information.
4. Promises of brain imaging
One of the main strategic aims, when Sarah-Jayne Blakemore and I
first talked about founding a journal as a home for the rapidly multi-
plying studies in the field, was to encourage research that used mea-
sures of brain structure or activity together with cognitive tasks. This,
we hoped, would lead to a sea change. Up to the beginning of the 21st
century, there had been only vague speculations, if any, about the re-
lationship between developing mind and brain. I think the wealth of
papers published in the journal Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience,
and their increasing sophistication over the last ten years, has shown
that our optimism was not misplaced. Actually, we might have expected
far slower progress, because it was only since the 1990s that researchers
could use Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scanning combined with
efficient statistical analyses to measure brain activity. Furthermore,
there was still doubt back then as to whether MRI scanners were suf-
ficiently safe to be used with young children. Of course, MRI is not the
only technology to look into the living brain. Electroencephalography
(EEG) had been there for decades and Magnetoencephalography (MEG)
was just being established. Gervain et al. (2011) discussed the use of
functional Near Infrared Spectrosopy (fNIRS) with infants in the very
first issue of the journal, when this technique was still hardly known.
Now its use allows the study of individuals moving about in the real
world (Pinti et al., 2018).
We now know more about the what and where, but how is in-
formation processed in the brain? One promising approach to this
question is to use computational models. Currently, only a limited
number of models of cognitive abilities are available, mostly focussed
on learning and decision making (van den Bos et al., 2016; Hauser
et al., 2019). Differences in brain activation over time have been most
successfully tracked over the period of adolescence (for an overview see
Blakemore, 2018). This is a particularly flourishing part of the field as
seen in numerous papers published in Developmental Cognitive Neu-
roscience. Some fundamental questions have been answered. As men-
tioned above, there is evidence for the existence of localised regions
sensitive to processing particular types of information. There is evi-
dence for plasticity of structure and function with specialised training,
such as music (Habibi et al., 2016). There is also evidence for sensitive
periods, although still mostly in animals (Byrne et al., 2017; Sugiyama,
Prochiantz and Hensch, 2009).
5. And limitations
Other questions have proved rather more difficult to answer. For
example: What actually is the road map for brain development? Which
regions mature earlier and are pruned earlier, and which later?
However, since Peter Huttenlocher’s pioneering work, there are strong
indications that bottom-up connections are myelinated before top-down
connections, and this matches behavioural observations: babies’ per-
ceptual skills surpass their ability to perform voluntary actions. What
are the limits of malleability as a result of learning? How can temporary
changes be distinguished from long term changes due to external sti-
mulation, such as education? What, if any, are the signs of the potential
for learning a particular skill before learning even starts? When and
how does the prefrontal-parietal control system exert itself? What are
the cognitive symptoms in different genetic syndromes that involve
abnormal brain development? What are the precursors of psychiatric
disorders starting during adolescence or young adulthood? These
questions are wide open and might prove fertile grounds for future
research.
Did we expect too much from existing measures of brain activity?
Probably yes. The usual measures are miniscule increases and decreases
in the blood flow, correlated with neural activity, averaged over many
trials, and over many participants. Let us remember that we are only
indirectly generating information by subtracting activity observed be-
tween two task conditions that hopefully differ in just the one critical
variable of interest. Looking at a single brain at a single point of a test
trail produces too weak a signal and includes too much noise.
Unfortunately, the interpretation and refining of the measures obtained
by MRI, for example, by combining them with EEG or MEG measures
does not make the interpretation any easier. Amazingly we still don’t
know for sure what it means for a brain region to be more active or less
active, when comparing individuals with a different clinical diagnosis,
or individuals at different stages of learning, or different levels of
achievement. Also, being limited by the available technology, we do not
know what changes in grey matter and white matter mean at the cel-
lular level (Reynell and Harris, 2013; Easson and McIntosh, 2019).
6. Tantalising
There are many ways in which the application of brain imaging
technology has changed our understanding of cognitive development.
There are numerous new observations about where and how informa-
tion is processed in the brain, and many of them have found a place in
the journal Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience. But, most tanta-
lising, to me at least, is a finding that has not yet received much
comment: Multiple studies have confirmed that regions, which were
known from adult neurology and neuropsychology to be associated
with particular functions, seem to be associated with these functions
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already in childhood. This applies for instance to language and speech
(Marklund et al., 2019), face recognition (Nordt et al., 2018) and ar-
ithmetic skill (Peters and De Smedt, 2018). It is true even for social
capacities, such as mentalising (Mahy et al., 2014).
It could have been otherwise. Indeed, how can it be that the future
space for cognitive functions is already staked out, when these func-
tions are not even there? It is almost uncanny to see how the infant
brain pre-figures the adult brain (Dehaene-Lambertz & Spelke, 2015). It
is an insight that gives pause for reflection: Are infant brains miniature
adult brains after all? What are the implications for brain plasticity?
7. Challenges in the study of the developing mind and brain
There are teething problems in all emerging disciplines, and de-
velopmental cognitive neuroscience is no exception. One of the most
well-known temptations is to interpret correlation as causation. Both,
biological and psychological variables can be viewed as causes. For
example, brain changes cause behavioural changes, as during puberty,
where we can trace the effects of hormones. A good example of beha-
vioural changes causing brain changes is learning to read (Caffarra
et al., 2017; Liebig et al., 2017). Ellwood-Lowe et al. (2016) warn of the
temptation to use reverse inference to explain findings that relate lan-
guage and other cognitive variables to brain activity or to socio-
economic status (SES). Catching changes in brain activity and in be-
haviour in children of different ages sounds straightforward. But it is
not (Pfeifer et al., 2018). For instance, chronological age does not
provide a secure basis for comparison since the course and speed of
development of individual children is not directly pegged to the ca-
lendar.
Further, while development means change by definition, it is worth
reminding ourselves that the changes are unlikely to be unidirectional
(see Smith and Thelen, 2003, for a theoretical discussion of dynamic
non-linear changes in cognitive development). An example of a possible
set back is evident when considering the consequences of a change in
social status when a child moves from primary to secondary school.
Given Huttenlocher’s discovery of pruning and the notion of sensitive
periods, it is no surprise that younger children can sometimes outper-
form older children. Acquiring the distinct phonology of your mother
tongue might be an example. Another example is a decrease in sensi-
tivity to statistical probabilities after the age of 12 years, as shown by
Janacsek et al. (2012) using a serial reaction time task. Similarly, Rohlf
et al. (2017) showed that 6-months old infants were superior to adults
in implicit crossmodal learning using event-related potentials and se-
quences made up of auditory and visual elements.
One of the obstacles to progress in developmental psychology may
well be the belief that tracking changes is an aim in itself, and is the
same as tracking causal dependencies. However, the fact that B comes
after A does not necessarily mean that there is a causal connection. It
merely tells us about precedence. This key question – what is a neces-
sary prerequisite for changes in development? – is nearly intractable,
given the random variation that is part and parcel of the developmental
process (Vogt, 2015). We simply cannot manipulate experimentally the
conditions in human beings, as this would be profoundly unethical.
Longitudinal studies whether of group averages or of individual tra-
jectories have been an important tool in our field and their problems
and solutions are discussed by King et al. (2018). Still, important
though they are, they are unlikely to advance a causal understanding of
development.
8. Finding ways around obstacles
There is another way. A great opportunity is offered by the study of
disorders of development. Here it may be possible to trace a missing
prerequisite at the cognitive level in the causal chain, as I myself tried
to do in the case of autism and dyslexia (Frith, 2013a). In autism, a
failure in automatic mentalising allowed a parsimonious explanation of
the characteristic difficulties in reciprocal social interaction and com-
munication (Frith, Leslie & Morton, 1991). The difficulty in under-
standing false beliefs (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985) was a novel
prediction from this theory, as was the difficulty in understanding
picture stories with social content, but not those with physical content
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1986). Mentalising failure also explained
some puzzling observations; for instance, the absence of pretend play
(Wing & Gould, 1979), and the difficulties in the fluent understanding
of deception in autistic children (Sodian & Frith, 1992). In dyslexia, the
assumption of a failure in phonological processing gave a parsimonious
explanation of the difficulty in acquiring a phoneme-grapheme code,
and predicted difficulties in speech processing tasks (e.g. Frith, 1999).
There are still unexploited opportunities to study development,
failure and resilience of cognitive processes through the investigation of
neurodevelopmental disorders. Research on so far identified genetic
syndromes has produced rich data on structural brain abnormalities
(e.g. Sethi et al., 2018), but we know far too little about the specific and
general cognitive and behavioural consequences. It remains puzzling
that, despite the evidence for brain plasticity and repair, these con-
sequences can be so severe. Research on the consequences of early brain
injury and prematurity have suggested that the brain is resilient and can
partially reconfigure itself (Stiles et al., 2005). However, there are also
findings that indicate that some early injuries and abnormalities con-
tinue to be associated with lasting cognitive impairments (Vargha-
Khadem et al., 1997; Luu et al., 2009).
One of the more encouraging findings when tracking behaviour in
children with neurodevelopmental disorders, is that behaviour im-
proves with learning, even without targeted intervention or teaching.
‘Compensatory learning’ is an interesting phenomenon that has not yet
been studied in much detail (but see Livingstone and Happé, 2017).
Thus, despite missing cognitive prerequisites (aka start-up kits, see
below), there are unusual and roundabout routes that may eventually
reach a similar behavioural goal. This is not so much about re-
configuring the brain, as making use of redundancy in multiple possible
pathways. This is strikingly demonstrated in the case of dyslexia, where
skilled reading can be mastered through alternative strategies, which
are served by alternative neural pathways (e.g. Barquero et al., 2014).
This reinforces one of the foundational principles of cognitive psy-
chology: behaviour is only what you see on the surface. The underlying
processes are not only hidden, but diverse, and they can be revealed by
an array of suitable tests.
9. A wish list for future research: from start-up kits to abstract
reasoning
If we adopt an evolutionary framework, and we really should, then
we need to ask questions about the nature of the long evolved and now
innate start-up kits that underlie our cognitive capacities. Using a ma-
chine metaphor, I envisage start-up kits as the brain’s factory settings,
forged during the long process of evolution (Frith, 2013b). I imagine
that certain stimuli that were once crucial for survival have acquired
and now sustain the ability to trigger actions in the organism. A good
example for an unlearned predisposition is the ability to detect ani-
macy, using only self propulsion as cue, which has been demonstrated
in newborn chicks as well as in newborn humans (Di Giorgio et al.,
2016).
From the ability to detect animacy it may only a small step to the
ability to detect agency and differentiate self from others. But addi-
tional cognitive mechanisms are needed to detect the nature of the
agenFor instance, is it prey or predator? Ingroup or outgroup member?
These are only some foundations of the social brain, and there are likely
to be many more, filling a large programme of research. One thread to
follow up is how start-up kits prioritise their own domains and make
learning fast and efficient. How does this type of fast learning differ
from other types of learning that are based on explicit teaching? How
do the frontal-parietal control systems in the human brain manage to
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control and override the triggers set by our ancient predispositions?
How many start-up kits for social cognition might exist? What are their
substrates are in the brain? We can only speculate at present.
Start-up kits for social capacities, such as agency detection, affilia-
tion, mentalising, empathy, and in-group loyalty, seem to be re-
markably independent of abstract reasoning abilities. Autism and psy-
chopathy demonstrate that one or more of the basic social
predispositions can be missing regardless of general intellectual ability.
But what of abstract reasoning abilities? They are particularly inter-
esting because they develop relatively late with a key role played by
prefrontal cortex (Dumontheil, 2014). Presumably these abilities have
an innate basis as well, otherwise, how could we explain their presence
in all humans in all cultures, and their absence in cases of severe brain
pathology. Perhaps, reasoning appeared as a by-product of least effort
principles, such as using a straight line to reach a goal (Gergely and
Csibra, 2003). Perhaps, reasoning appeared as a by-product of compe-
tition in verbal contests, since arguments, especially those that serve
self-justification, are an effective means for winning over rivals
(Mercier and Sperber, 2017).
Of all the human abilities, the origin of conscious reasoning and
rational thinking, seems most obscure. It is likely that cultural teaching
is critical for nurturing and shaping this ability. One obvious benefit of
rational thinking is that it fosters self-control and inhibits impulsive
responses that might have bad consequences. However, it does not al-
ways lead to the ‘right’ behaviour. Our conscious reasoning, once ac-
quired, is able to provide us with excellent justifications for our pre-
judices and self-serving biases. Our unconscious predispositions, likes
and dislikes, and ‘visceral’ feelings, can sometimes lead us towards
better decisions. Can we learn to strike a balance between unconscious
urges and conscious reason? This might mean that we always need to
take account of broader social and environmental conditions as well as
of intuitions. For example, resisting that marshmallow is not a good
idea in a volatile environment (Kidd et al., 2013).
We need to be open to some really hard questions. For example, can
we ever predict individual differences? Are average trajectories of the
development of cognitive functions and brain structure even mean-
ingful? Is there just too much noise in developing systems, an inherent
chaotic complexity? Studies with genetically identical mice (Freund
et al., 2013) and cloned fish (Bierbach et al., 2017) raised in an iden-
tical environment, suggest that individuality might be an inevitable and
essentially unpredictable outcome of development. This would make it
likely that the causes of developmental disorders, even if firmly rooted
in genetic origins, are never exactly the same between one individual
and another. If so, then it would be more profitable to study develop-
mental processes retrospectively rather than prospectively, tracing
forking paths from the end back to the beginning. However, this is not
how we tend to formulate theories at present.
Only ten years have passed since the founding of our journal
Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, and it is still too early to judge
the success or otherwise of the enterprise so far. However, ten years,
roughly speaking, is a milestone in child development. It marks at once
the end of childhood proper and the beginning of dramatic changes
leading to adolescence. Flux is duly in flux. I wish the Journal and the
Society all the best for an exciting future.
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